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I. INTRODUCTION 
Prosecutors occupy a special place in American legal ethics 
scholarship. Their distinct ethical obligation as ministers of justice1 
coupled with their troubling ethical failures in practice,2 have inspired 
cogent analysis and biting criticism.3 For decades American scholars 
 
* University of Warwick 
** University of Calgary 
1. Berger v. United States 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
2. See, e.g., Monroe Freedman, The Use of Unethical and Unconstitutional Practices and 
Policies by Prosecutors’ Offices, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2012); Abbe Smith, Are Prosecutors 
Born or Made?, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL STUD. 943 (2012); Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans 
Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. Thompson, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS. 
913 (2012); Bennett L. Gershman, Threats and Bullying by Prosecutors, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
327 (2014); John G. Browning, Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Digital Age, 77 ALB. L. REV. 
881 (2014). 
3. Amongst the many brilliant papers by American scholars, the work of Bruce Green, the 
late Fred Zacharias and Abbe Smith stand out. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of 
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991) 
[hereinafter Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics]; Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional 
Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 223 (1993) [hereinafter Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility 
Codes]; Bruce Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice?”, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 
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have assessed the existence and consequences of deficiencies in 
prosecutorial conduct, and proposed solutions to encourage better 
behavior.4 
Although this obscures the complexity and nuance of any given 
article, the scholarship tends to advance one (or more) of the following 
propositions: that prosecutorial misconduct exists and has serious 
consequences for the justice and fairness of American criminal law;5 
that the rhetoric surrounding prosecutorial ethics (the “do justice” 
imperative) ought to be differently articulated, understood or refined;6 
that prosecutorial misconduct should be more effectively and 
comprehensively regulated;7 and that the structure of prosecutorial 
 
(1992); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 355 (2001). 
4. For an early assessment, see Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of 
the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030 (1967).  
5. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 2; Smith, supra, note 2; Smith, supra, note 3; 
Yaroshefsky, supra, note 2; Gershman, supra note 2; Browning, supra note 2. 
6. See, e.g., Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 3; Green, supra, note 3; Carolyn 
Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1309 (2002) (suggesting that the “do justice” imperative is relatively recent); R. 
Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us about a 
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek Justice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635 (2006); H. Richard 
Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1695 (2000); Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 259 (2001); Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 309 (2001); Jane Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the Ministers of 
Justice, 86 NEBR. L. REV. 1 (2007); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 79 (2010); Russell M. Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor’s 
Role, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1591 (2014); Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal 
Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2016) (playing out a thought experiment on the implications 
for justice if prosecutors were adversarial rather than ministers of justice); Eric S. Fish, 
Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV 237 (2017).  
7. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics in Retrospect, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
461 (2017); Freedman, supra note 2; Browning, supra  note 2; Fred C. Zacharias, The 
Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001) [hereinafter Zacharias, 
Professional Discipline]; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful 
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions]; Bruce A. Green & 
Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutor’s Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2002); 
Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, WISCONSIN L. REV. 837, 903 
(2004)  (critiquing the normative idea of prosecutorial neutrality, but also suggesting the need 
for “a public articulation of clearer first- and second-order principles that can guide prosecutorial 
decisions”) [hereinafter Green & Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality]; Zacharias, Specificity in 
Professional Responsibility Code, supra note 3; Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System 
WISCONSIN L. REV. 399; (2006); H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, 
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offices and work responsibilities ought to change to encourage more 
ethical and lawful conduct by prosecutors.8 
For the most part, the literature focuses on the experiences and 
challenges of American prosecutors,9 assessing the particular sorts of 
misconduct engaged in by American prosecutors, the norms that 
govern them, how they are regulated and the structure and culture in 
which prosecutors work. That focus is neither wrong nor unsurprising. 
Its effect, however, may be to miss insights that can be gained by 
looking beyond the American experience. Specifically, if prosecutors 
elsewhere engage in misconduct, but work in different legal systems 
and cultures than do American prosecutors, it may be possible to refine 
the analysis of what it is that causes or can prevent bad behavior by 
prosecutors. 
This Article provides that sort of comparative analysis. It reviews 
the existence of and context for prosecutorial misconduct in Canada 
and France, considering both the similarities and differences from the 
American experience. It observes that in both countries, as in America, 
prosecutorial misconduct occurs and is a significant problem for the 
fair and proper administration of criminal justice. The nature of that 
misconduct is, however, different in some respects from the American 
experience; in neither Canada nor France can prosecutors use the 
existence of severe mandatory minimum sentences to coerce plea 
bargains from a criminal accused. In Canada plea bargaining is an 
important part of the criminal justice system, but an accused who goes 
to trial has not traditionally faced materially higher sanctions than an 
accused who enters a plea before trial. In France, although a formal 
 
Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51 (2013); Melanie D. Wilson,  
Anti-Justice, 81 TENNESSEE L. REV. 699 (2014) (arguing that lack of public scrutiny leads to 
prosecutors failing to do justice). 
8. Uviller, supra note 6; Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good 
Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 PENNSYLVANIA ST. L. REV. 1133 (2005); Daniel S. Medwed, The 
Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the Post-Conviction 
Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2009); Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse? 
How the American Prosecutor Came to Devour Those He is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN 
L.J. 513 (2012); Fish, supra note 6; Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of 
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009). 
9. For exceptions, see ERIK LUNA & MARIANNE WADE, THE PROSECUTOR IN 
PERSPECTIVE (2012); Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1413 (2010) [hereinafter Luna & Wade, Prosecutors as Judges]; Michael Tonry, 
Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2012). 
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“guilty plea” procedure was introduced in 2004,10 it remains limited to 
minor and middle-ranking offenses11 and does not lead to a negotiation 
on charges in practice.12 
In both countries, as in America, the norms governing prosecutors 
focus on the prosecutors’ responsibilities to do justice and to ensure a 
fair trial for an accused. And in both countries, those norms fail to 
consistently generate conduct by prosecutors that matches those norms 
and do not provide ways to cogently explain the difference between 
good conduct by prosecutors and bad.13 As well, neither country 
effectively regulates bad conduct by prosecutors. In Canada, a 
prosecutor’s failures during a criminal trial may result in a successful 
application for a mistrial, or even a stay of proceedings, but they are 
highly unlikely to result in professional discipline for the misbehaving 
prosecutor.14 In France, disciplinary proceedings before the Conseil 
Supérieur de la Magistrature (“CSM” or "High Council for the 
Judiciary”) against public prosecutors are rare, particularly with 
regards to their behavior during criminal proceedings.15 
Finally, prosecutors in Canada and in France have professional 
responsibilities and work structures and environments that vary from 
those in the United States, to a greater (e.g., France) or lesser (e.g., 
Canada) extent. Canadian prosecutors are not elected. They work as 
civil servants for either the provincial Attorney General (primarily) or 
for the federal Public Prosecution Service (secondarily, and mostly in 
 
10. Comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité [Procedure on prior 
recognition of guilt] (“CRPC”) (2004) (Fr.). See Jacqueline Hodgson, Guilty Pleas and the 
Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Justice, in ERIK LUNA & MARIANNE 
WADE, supra note 9, at 116–34.  
11. In this procedure, the prosecutor can offer a sentence to the defendant if the offense is 
admitted, but the sentence cannot exceed one year in prison. 
12.  See Laurène Soubise, Guilty Pleas in an Inquisitorial Setting – An Empirical Study of 
France, 45 J. L. & Soc’y 398, 418 (2018). 
13. See Alice Woolley, Reconceiving the Standard Conception of the Prosecutor’s Role, 
95 CANADIAN B. REV. 795 (2017). 
14. See ALICE WOOLLEY, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN CANADA § 9.86- 9.93.  
(2d ed. 2017).  
15. Disciplinary proceedings were started against a single prosecutor in 2016; two in 2015 
(including one for having made discriminatory comments about the travelers’ community during 
a hearing); and six in 2014. Most disciplinary proceedings concern behaviors independent of 
any criminal case (i.e., prosecutors committing criminal offences in their private life): Les 
compétences disciplinaires du CSM, CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DE LA MAGISTRATURE, 
http://www.conseil-superieur-magistrature.fr/missions/discipline/arborescence-des-decisions-
et-avis-disciplinaires [https://perma.cc/V5CM-5GSV].  
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relation to drug offences). Canadian prosecutors individually and 
collectively enjoy significant independence. They are largely immune 
from regulation by provincial law societies, from judicial review of 
exercises of prosecutorial discretion, or for an action in wrongful 
prosecution.16 Courts also defer to decisions made by prosecutors at 
trial.17 Canadian prosecutors do, however, receive considerable 
direction in the form of departmental guidelines, particularly in relation 
to how they ought to exercise prosecutorial discretion.18 
French prosecutors are not elected either. The French public 
prosecution service is organized hierarchically with the Minister of 
Justice, a member of the government, at the top of the pyramid. The 
primary source of guidance to prosecutors in France is the law, voted 
upon by Parliament. Government’s instructions are also communicated 
to procureurs (French public prosecutors) through circulars issued by 
the Minister of Justice. In practice, the organization in separate remits 
allows each procureur to work relatively independently on their own 
files, under the overarching (but relatively distant) authority of the head 
of each local office.19 
Considering these similarities and differences between the United 
States, Canada and France suggests to us the following propositions in 
relation to the American literature on professional misconduct. First, 
creating appropriate norms around prosecutorial behavior, or refining 
the norms that currently exist, is unlikely to result in any material shift 
in how prosecutors behave. In each country, the robust support for 
prosecutors as quasi-ministers of justice has failed to produce 
consistently ethical behavior. The behavior of prosecutors routinely 
fails to match the norms said to govern that behavior. The nature of 
prosecutorial misconduct in each country—that it exists, but the 
different shape that it takes—seems logically connected to the 
substantive criminal law and to the specific duties of prosecutors in 
each country in relation to enforcing the criminal law. This suggests, in 
our view, that reforming prosecutorial conduct requires a primary focus 
 
16.  For an overview, see supra note 14, at §§ 9.7-9.120. 
17.  See discussion infra Part III. 
18.  See id.; see also e.g., R. v. Anderson, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, para. 58 (Can.); DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE OF CANADA DESKBOOK (2014), available at 
https://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/d-g-eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4D5U-3NSH]. 
19. Jacqueline Hodgson & Laurène Soubise, Prosecution in France, OXFORD 
HANDBOOKS ONLINE (2016), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199935383.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935383-e-124 [https://perma.cc/PMP8-HXC7]. 
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on ensuring that the structure and work responsibilities of prosecutors 
encourage and incentivize the type of actions we want prosecutors to 
take (and discourages and disincentives the type of actions we don’t 
want prosecutors to take). Improved professional regulation is part of 
this structural change. This change may not be possible in practice, as 
suggested by the unwillingness of any jurisdiction to meaningfully 
regulate prosecutors, but we do not see any other means to effectively 
address problems with prosecutorial behavior. 
To make this argument, Part II of this Article provides an 
overview of the nature of prosecutorial misconduct in the United States 
and scholarly responses to that misconduct. Part III reviews the 
circumstances and issues related to misconduct by Canadian 
prosecutors. Part IV sets out the role played by French prosecutors in 
an inquisitorial system, focusing on the expectations of prosecutors and 
the gap between those expectations and actual practice. Part V sets out 
the conclusions that we argue follow from this comparative review and, 
in particular, what it suggests about how we can best address the cross-
national problems of prosecutorial misconduct. 
II. AMERICA 
Prosecutorial misconduct is a significant issue in American 
criminal justice.20 While undoubtedly many prosecutors act ethically 
and responsibly,21 American case law and scholarship documents 
 
20. John Browning defines prosecutorial misconduct as “what occurs when a prosecutor 
deliberately engages in dishonest or fraudulent behavior calculated to produce an unjust result.” 
Browning, supra note 2, at 881. Gershman has a similar view about the importance of 
prosecutorial intention. See Gershman, supra note 2, at 160. However, Gershman also suggests 
that courts should “presume that a prosecutor’s conduct is planned.” Problematic prosecutorial 
conduct can, however, be both intentional and unintentional—a prosecutor may simply not 
perceive the risk of injustice occasioned by a particular decision. Whether or not that prosecutor 
deserves to be sanctioned is a different question than whether or not the behavior creates a risk 
of injustice. See generally Alafair Burke, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure 
Obligations: What Really Works?: Talking about Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO. L. REV. 2119 
(2010). For the purposes of this Article, our concern is both with the deliberate misconduct 
identified by Browning, and conduct which in effect improperly undermines the fairness of the 
process or outcome of a criminal trial. 
21. Bruce Green has suggested that prosecutor’s offices accept the “do justice” 
requirement and often adopt “internal guidelines establishing restraints on prosecutorial conduct 
in addition to those imposed by law or by ethics rules.” Green, supra note 3, at 616-17. 
Elsewhere Zacharias and Green suggest that prosecutors “rarely deserve exclusive or primary 
blame for the conviction of innocent defendants . . . [but] they invariably play some role in 
producing them.” Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 7, at 
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troubling ethical lapses both in commencing and prosecuting criminal 
trials. In an informal survey of fifty defense lawyers, Abbe Smith 
discovered that those lawyers describe only between two and fifteen 
percent of the prosecutors they deal with as not “smug, self-important, 
or lacking in imagination.”22 Peter Joy has observed that “prosecutorial 
misconduct has proven to be one of the most common factors that 
causes or contributes to wrongful convictions.”23 Daniel Epps notes 
that “[w]hile many prosecutors discharge their duties honorably, too 
many shirk their ethical duties sometimes doggedly pursuing 
defendants despite compelling evidence of innocence—and in far too 
many cases have been responsible for serious injustice.”24 
American prosecutors from time to time present false evidence, 
fail to provide proper disclosure, pose improper questions to witnesses, 
make improper closing arguments, and misrepresent facts to the 
court.25 They intimidate witnesses at grand jury investigations, attack 
witnesses for the defense with the threat of perjury charges, bully 
witnesses into giving certain kinds of testimony for the prosecution, 
compel people to drop civil rights suits against the police through the 
threat of prosecution, use shaming of white collar accused to induce 
cooperation with the prosecution, and push corporations to give up their 
employees to avoid criminal prosecution.26 Some American 
prosecutors engage in inappropriate ex parte communications and 
make improper public statements about on-going litigation.27 They 
unduly resist post-conviction motions challenging the validity of a 
conviction.28 Frequently, they use the structure of American criminal 
 
6 and 8. Melanie Wilson has argued that the prosecutors “effectively fulfill” the duty to do justice 
in charging, trial and sentencing decisions because the “prosecutor’s role is defined adequately 
and her power constrained sufficiently by outside scrutiny.” Wilson supra note 7, at 703-04. 
22. Smith, supra note 2,  at 953-54. 
23. Joy, supra note 7, at 403. Zacharias and Green suggest that while prosecutors “rarely 
deserve exclusive or primary blame for the conviction of innocent defendants” but that “they 
invariably play some role in producing them.” Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful 
Convictions, supra note 7, at 6, 8. 
24. Epps, supra note 6, at 765. Zacharias noted “[a]llegations of prosecutorial misconduct 
abound in the cases and academic literature.” Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 7, 
at 725. 
25. Freedman, supra note 2; Zacharias Professional Discipline, supra note 7, at 731; 
Yaroshefsky, supra note 2; Hoeffel, supra note 8; Smith, supra note 3, at 391; Joy, supra note 
7, at 402-03. 
26. Gershman, supra note 2. 
27. Browning, supra note 2. Browning notes a wide range of cases where prosecutors have 
committed misconduct through technology. 
28. Medwed, supra note 8. 
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justice, including its imposition of severe mandatory minimums, as a 
tool for effectively coercing an accused to accept a plea. As described 
by Jonathan Rapping: 
Today, more than ninety-five per cent of all criminal cases are 
resolved through guilty pleas. Our legal system, which now leaves 
so many little option but to plead guilty, has evolved because so 
many prosecutors take advantage of one or more of the following 
structural realities: (1) a more expansive criminal code, harsher 
sentences, and broader criminal liability; (2) excessive bail 
schemes that often leave poor people with no choice but to accept 
a plea in exchange for freedom; and (3) overburdened court 
appointed lawyers who have neither the time nor resources to 
adequately prepare for trial or advise their clients. For the 
prosecutor who takes as given the unmanageable number of cases 
in an underfunded system, and who views his or her obligation as 
securing as many convictions as possible, taking advantage of 
these features might seem to be effective law enforcement. But this 
prosecutor has a misunderstanding of what justice truly means and 
his or her duty to achieve it.29 
And even ethical prosecutors in America can only do as much 
justice as the American system of criminal justice permits which, as 
Abbe Smith has cogently argued, may not be enough: 
Prosecutors uphold the banishment of a generation of African 
American men simply by playing their role in the context of 
today’s criminal justice system. The government has devoted an 
arsenal of resources to a mean-spirited and misguided criminal 
justice policy that has literally stolen hope for the next generation 
from entire communities. There is no redemption under this 
policy, no belief that people who have done wrong could ever rise 
above their pasts and contribute something of value. There is only 
the prison cell. It is the role of the prosecutor, the government’s 
lawyer, to carry out these policies.30 
 
29. Rapping, supra note 8, at 551. Smith, supra note 3, at 391. Richard Uviller notes that, 
as a prosecutor, the decision to commence or continue with charges was much more difficult to 
make impartially once trial preparation started: “I was just too zipped, buckled, and helmeted 
into my flight suit at that point to think about much else than the impending trial mission.” 
Uviller, supra note 6, at 1695. Rachel Barkow also discusses how the intersection of 
prosecutorial decisions and systemic factors creates a real risk for prosecutorial abuse of power. 
Barkow, supra note 8, at 878-83. 
30. Smith, supra note 3, at 374. 
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Commentators have not identified an adequate solution to the 
problem of prosecutorial misconduct—that is, one likely to be both 
effective and practically possible to implement. As evidenced by 
President Donald Trump’s pardon of Sherriff Joe Arpaio, not everyone 
views aggressive and even unlawful efforts to “fight crime” as a social 
problem that needs solving.31 American prosecutors work at the 
federal, state and county level. Some are elected. Some are civil 
servants. The circumstances under which prosecutors work, the 
incentives to which they are subject, and the substantive law they apply, 
vary considerably.32 No singular response can sufficiently account for 
that variation and address the different sorts of prosecutorial 
misconduct that it produces. 
With that said, commentators have responded to deficiencies in 
prosecutorial conduct. Many have discussed issues in the overarching 
obligation of prosecutors to do justice,33 the lack of meaningful 
direction it provides to prosecutors, its inherent vagueness, and the 
irreducible conflict between the duty as stated and the prosecutor’s 
obligation as an adversarial advocate.34 Abbe Smith argues that the 
exhortation to do justice corrupts prosecutorial ethics, encouraging 
prosecutorial arrogance and abuse of power: “too often righteousness 
 
31. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe Arpaio, Who Became 
Face of Crackdown on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/us/politics/joe-arpaio-trump-pardon-sheriff-
arizona.html?_r=0 (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). 
32.  See, e.g., Hoeffel, supra note 8, at 1138-39.  
33. “The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all, and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
The American Bar Association Rule 3.8, Commentary 1 states “A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility 
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that 
guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to 
prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 3.8, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
34. See, e.g., Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 3, at 
250 (“Different prosecutors . . . can justify diametrically opposite conduct as serving justice.”); 
Green, supra note 3, at 616, 622 (“Standing alone, the injunction points in many directions . . . 
The injunction may even point in contradictory directions.”); Joy, supra note 7, at 400, 427; 
Medwed, supra note 8, at 42; Epps, supra note 6, at 783 (“This conception of the prosecutorial 
role has problems. For one, the content of the norm is famously hard to pin down. What does it 
mean for a prosecutor to “seek justice”?”); Rapping, supra note 8, at 519 (“This imprecision [in 
the duty] has left prosecutors to define their role as they see fit.”); Caldwell, supra note 7, at 57. 
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becomes self-righteousness. Too often prosecutors believe that because 
it is their job to do justice, they have extraordinary in-born wisdom and 
insight. Too often prosecutors believe that they and only they know 
what justice is.”35 It gives prosecutors the “white hat” in the 
courtroom.36 
In response commentators have sought to clarify and improve the 
“do justice” ethic. Bruce Green and Fred Zacharias in particular, both 
together and individually have done remarkable work to make sense of 
the “do justice” obligation and its relationship to the prosecutor’s 
adversarial advocacy. 
Zacharias argued that the obligation to “do justice” can be made 
coherent if you see it as having two essential elements: an obligation 
not to prosecute absent a good faith belief in an accused’s guilt and an 
obligation to “ensure that the basic elements of the adversary system 
exist” in a criminal trial.37 The obligation is not to ensure that a trial 
achieves a just outcome, substantively speaking; the obligation is to 
ensure the accomplishment of the adversarial process on which justice 
depends. That obligation would give rise to special duties for the 
prosecutor where there is inadequate defense counsel, where the 
resources are unequal such that “competent defense attorneys lack the 
tools to offer a vigorous case, despite their best efforts”38 and where 
the process fails from, for example, biased or over-reactive tribunals. It 
also requires the prosecutor to respect limits on some adversarial tactics 
that do not apply to defense counsel.39 Zacharias noted significant 
issues with this articulation of the duty but suggested that it “would 
have some effect on prosecutorial conduct.”40 
Green has argued that the prosecutor’s obligation to do justice 
flows from the fact that the prosecutor acts as a proxy for the sovereign, 
and the sovereign’s interest is in substantive justice. As such, the 
prosecutor’s duty requires punishing the guilty, avoiding the 
punishment of the innocent, and ensuring that “people are treated fairly. 
As the government’s surrogate, the prosecutor’s job is to carry out all 
 
35. Smith, supra note 3, at 378. 
36. Hoeffel, supra note 8, at 1140. 
37. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics, supra note 3, at 50. 
38. Id. at 84. 
39. Id. at 66-94. 
40. Id. at 108. 
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these objectives and resolve the tension among them.”41 Green argued 
that this approach can be reconciled with the prosecutor’s “instinct to 
do battle;” this reconciliation simply requires that prosecutors restrict 
that instinct to cases that warrant it, bearing in mind as well other 
objectives the government ought to pursue.42 
Together Green and Zacharias explored the capacity of the 
principle of neutrality to inform prosecutorial decision-making.43 In 
their view the principle of neutrality could be further articulated to 
suggest that prosecutorial decision-making should be non-biased, non-
partisan and principled.44 They suggested, however, that neither the 
general concept of neutrality nor these more articulated sub-principles 
could on their own guide prosecutorial decision-making.45 The 
meaning of the principles and sub-principles is variable and how they 
fit together uncertain.46 They cannot ultimately provide meaningful 
guidance “for the discretionary decisions that prosecutors routinely 
must make.”47 Green and Zacharias sought “deeper thinking by 
prosecutors and for a public articulation of clearer first- and second-
order principles that can guide prosecutors’ decisions.”48 
Others have suggested that prosecutor’s overarching duty ought 
to be “to the truth,”49 that the prosecutor’s obligation should be infused 
with the norms and practices of virtue ethics, in which the focus “is on 
the character of individual prosecutors making discretionary 
decisions,”50 that it should require prosecutors to suppress 
constitutionally dubious evidence even where that evidence might be 
admissible in court,51 and have even explored the thought experiment 
that perhaps less injustice would result if prosecutors were consistently 
adversarial instead of seeking to do justice.52 
 
41. Green, supra note 3, at 642. 
42. Id. 
43. Green & Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, supra note 7. 
44.  Id. at 852.  
45.  Id. at 860. 
46.  Id. at 903. 
47. Id. at 837. 
48. Id. 
49. Gershman, supra note 6, at 314. 
50. Cassidy, supra note 6, at 639. 
51. Gold, supra note 6, at 1660. 
52. Epps, supra note 6, at 852. 
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In addition to suggesting changes to how we articulate and 
understand the general norms governing prosecutorial conduct, 
scholars have assessed the ability to use regulatory mechanisms to 
improve prosecutorial conduct. American prosecutors can face 
consequences for making poor choices in the conduct of a matter—
having a conviction overturned, for example—and have been subject 
to disciplinary proceedings.53 As a general matter, however, the 
disciplinary rules governing prosecutorial behavior are loosely drafted, 
generously interpreted and rarely result in professional discipline.54 
Prosecutors also enjoy immunity from civil liability for many of the 
decisions made with respect to a prosecution.55 Reforms that have been 
considered include clarifying and providing more precise and useful 
direction in disciplinary codes,56 broadening the scope of civil liability 
for prosecutors,57 creating an independent commission for addressing 
prosecutorial impropriety,58 and using competency provisions in codes 
of conduct to discipline prosecutors for actions that are reasonably 
 
53. See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 7, at 744-45: 
This study . . . dispels at least one myth: that prosecutors are never disciplined. 
Nevertheless, many of the cases are old, making the number of reported cases far 
from staggering in light of the many prosecutors and criminal cases that exist. Still 
the body of cases is not entirely negligible. The research suggests at least that, in 
appropriate cases, courts and disciplinary organizations sometimes have been willing 
to address prosecutorial misconduct. 
He notes that discipline tends to occur for illegal activity, for “procedural and evidentiary 
misconduct” and for “abusive behavior toward tribunals”). Id. at 746. See also Charles Maclean 
& Stephen Wilks, Keeping Arrows in the Quiver: Mapping the Contours of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 25 WASHBURN L. J. 59 (2012), 
54. See Zacharias, Professional Discipline, supra note 7; Zacharias, Specificity in 
Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 3; Freedman, supra note 2, 
55. Green, supra note 7, at 483: 
At least on the federal level, courts have shown little inclination to encourage civil 
lawsuits against prosecutors by lowering the bars posed by doctrines of absolute and 
qualified immunity. On the contrary, Supreme Court decisions have largely protected 
prosecutors from civil lawsuits arising out of professional misconduct, in part based 
on the stated assumption that professional discipline will fill the voice 
See also, Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 7. 
56. Joy, supra note 7, at 401; Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, 
supra note 3. But see Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 
7, at 58 (“[I]t is difficult to draft specific rules capturing all risky prosecutorial conduct that, in 
hindsight, should be deemed improper.”) 
57. Green, supra note 7, at 483. 
58. Caldwell, supra note 7. 
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likely to result in wrongful convictions.59 Zacharias and Green have 
suggested, however, that “[s]tanding alone, the disciplinary process 
will never adequately hold errant prosecutors accountable for their role 
in bringing about wrongful convictions.”60 
Finally, some American scholars have explored the possibility of 
shifting the structure, culture and work environment of prosecutors to 
improve prosecutorial conduct. The most significant involve separating 
the investigative, adjudicative functions from the prosecutor’s role as 
an advocate: 
I believe that for the office of prosecutor faithfully to discharge the 
incompatible roles of advocate and arbiter, the investigators and 
adjudicators should be segregated from the advocates. I do not say 
that the two bands cannot live happily under one roof, both 
responsible to the same chief. But I do think that those who 
investigate, assess, and negotiate settlement should belong to a 
different cadre from those who try the cases that fail to reach 
accord.61 
Other suggestions include shifting the cultural expectations of 
prosecutorial offices62 and having prosecutor’s offices set out the 
fundamental norms that ought to govern prosecutorial decision-
making.63 Those commenters claim that articulating the “principles and 
subprinciples of prosecution . . . can make the exercise of discretion 
more thoughtful, enable well-intentioned prosecutors to reach 
decisions with reference to impersonal norms, narrow inconsistency 
within a prosecutor’s office, and facilitate review by supervisory 
prosecutors.”64  
 
59. Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 7. However, 
Zacharias and Green ultimately conclude that such enforcement is not feasible. Indeed, they 
question generally “the viability of professional discipline as the principle mechanism for 
regulating the prosecution corps.” Id. at 58. 
60. Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 7, at 58-59. 
61. Uviller, supra note 6, at 1702. See also Barkow, supra note 8, 
62. Rapping, supra note 8, 
63.  Green & Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, supra note 7, at 904.  
64. Green & Zacharias, supra note 7, at 886. See also Fish, supra note 6, at 270-71: 
[I]ndividual prosecutors’ choices should be constrained through system-level rules 
that compel prosecutors to incorporate constitutional rights into their decision 
making. Such rules can be established at a number of different levels: individual 
offices, larger prosecution bureaucracies, or state bar associations. They can be 
implemented in a variety of ways: training prosecutors, imposing internal discipline, 
centralizing decisionmaking authority, creating positions tasked with protecting 
constitutional rights, and imposing bar sanctions. 
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This brief overview indicates that issues with prosecutorial 
conduct in America arise with respect to both exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion (charging and plea offers) and the conduct of a matter. The 
responses to that conduct involve trying to better understand and 
articulate the norms governing prosecutorial conduct, enhancing 
regulation of prosecutors, and shifting the culture and structure of 
prosecutorial work. The next Parts will consider prosecutorial conduct 
(and misconduct) in Canada and France before turning to what those 
comparisons reveal about the options for addressing prosecutorial 
misconduct discussed in the American literature. 
III. CANADA 
Canadian prosecutors work as civil servants for either the 
provincial or federal governments, with prosecutorial authority 
reflecting the division of powers between these two levels of 
government. Provincial prosecutors prosecute offences committed 
under the Criminal Code of Canada and provincial statutes,65 while 
federal prosecutors prosecute drug offenses under the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act,66 and crimes under other federal statutes such as 
the Income Tax Act.67 As is the case with American prosecutors, 
Canadian prosecutors exercise prosecutorial discretion to make 
“decisions regarding the nature and extent of [a] prosecution and the 
Attorney General’s participation in it.”68 This includes the power to 
 
65. See PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE OF CANADA, ANNUAL REPORT, 2011-2012 7 
(2012), http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/ar-ra/2011_2012/ar12-ra12.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LSR9-VYX8]. 
66. Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (Can.).  
67. Federal prosecutors also prosecute crimes under the Criminal Code in the three 
territories: the Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. See PUBLIC PROSECUTION SERVICE 
OF CANADA, supra note 65, at 4. The reason for the slightly counter-intuitive nature of the 
division of responsibilities between federal and provincial prosecutors is that under Canadian 
division of powers the federal government has responsibility for “[t]he Criminal Law, except 
the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal 
Matters.” Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, 91(27) (U.K.). The provincial government 
has responsibility for “The administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, 
Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction, 
and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts.” Id. 
68. Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372, para. 47 (Can.); R. v. 
Anderson, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, para. 44 (Can.). 
2018] PROSECUTORS & JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 601 
enter into plea agreements with the accused.69 They have a 
constitutional obligation to provide full disclosure to the accused, 
including disclosure of exculpatory information.70 They conduct 
criminal trials in courts structured on an adversarial model. This is the 
case even in the province of Québec, which uses the civil code rather 
than common law in civil matters. The trial courts of Québec are 
adversarial, and matters of criminal law and evidence are governed by 
the common law. As in the United States, there is no functional 
separation between prosecutors who exercise discretion about whether 
to commence or continue a criminal proceeding, and the prosecutors 
who conduct a criminal trial. 
Guidance for and control of prosecutorial decision-making arises 
from three sources: guidelines published by the provincial or federal 
department for which the prosecutor works, provincial law society 
codes of conduct, and case law. Each of the provinces and the federal 
government publish a policy manual or deskbook that sets out 
guidelines directing prosecutorial behavior.71 The policy manuals 
affirm the overarching duty of Canadian prosecutors to be ministers of 
justice.72 More specifically, the guidelines require that decisions to 
prosecute be based primarily on whether there is sufficient evidence to 
justify bringing or continuing proceedings and, secondarily, whether a 
prosecution is in the public interest.73 The guidelines provide 
considerable detail about how a prosecutor ought to assess a case in 
light of these criteria, requiring that the prosecutor’s assessment be 
 
69. Anderson, [2014] 2 S.C.R. at para. 45; R. v. Nixon, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 (Can.) 
(holding prosecutorial discretion includes the Crown’s power to repudiate a plea agreement). 
70. R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (Can.). 
71. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 18; NEW BRUNSWICK OFFICE OF ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, PUBLIC PROSECUTION OPERATIONAL MANUAL (2016), available at 
http://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/departments/attorney_general/operational_manual.html 
[https://perma.cc/4P22-9WSP]; ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., ONTARIO 
CROWN POLICY MANUAL (2017), available at https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/
english/crim/cpm/ [https://perma.cc/6GUU-G736]; ALBERTA JUSTICE AND SOLICITOR 
GENERAL, ALBERTA CROWN PROSECUTOR’S MANUAL (2015),  available at 
https://justice.alberta.ca/programs_services/criminal_pros/Publications%20Library%20%20Cri
minal%20Prosecutions/CrownProsecutorsManual.aspx; BRITISH COLUMBIA PROSECUTION 
SERV., BRITISH COLUMBIA CROWN COUNSEL POLICY MANUAL (2018), available at 
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/justice/criminal-justice/bc-prosecution-service/crown-
counsel-policy-manual [https://perma.cc/7A6W-2RD6]. 
72.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, §§ 2, 2.1. 
73. Id. at §2.3.2. For a more detailed discussion of how the guidelines constrain the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see WOOLLEY, supra note 14, at §9.30-§9.36. 
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“objective” rather than a matter of personal opinion.74 The guidelines 
also address a prosecutor’s conduct of a trial, identifying the 
prosecutor’s duties, which are the same as those that apply to any trial 
lawyer.75 For example, the Public Prosecution Service of Canada 
Deskbook provides: 
In order to maintain public confidence in the administration of 
justice, Crown counsel must not only act fairly; their conduct must 
be seen to be fair. One can act fairly while unintentionally leaving 
an impression of secrecy, bias or unfairness. 
Counsel fulfill this duty by: 
• making disclosure in accordance with the law; 
• bringing all relevant cases and authorities known to counsel to 
the attention of the court, even if they may be contrary to the 
Crown’s position; 
• not misleading the court; 
• not expressing personal opinions on the evidence, including 
the credibility of witnesses or on the guilt or innocence of the 
accused in court or in public. Such expressions of opinion are 
improper; 
• not adverting to any unproven facts, even if they are material 
and could have been admitted as evidence; 
• asking relevant and proper questions during the examination 
of a witness and not asking questions designed solely to 
embarrass, insult, abuse, belittle, or demean the witness. Cross 
examination can be skilful and probing, yet still show respect 
for the witness. The law distinguishes between a cross-
examination that is “persistent and exhaustive”, which is 
proper, and a cross-examination that is “abusive”; 
• stating the law accurately in oral pleadings; 
• respecting defence counsel, the accused, and the proceedings 
while vigorously asserting the Crown’s position, and not 
publicly and improperly criticizing defence strategy; 
 
74. DAVID LAYTON & MICHEL PROULX, ETHICS AND CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 603 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2d ed.  2015). See also Miazga v. Kvello Estate, [2009] S.C.R. 339, at 
para. 66 (Can.). 
75. See WOOLLEY, supra note 14, at §9.97. 
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• respecting the court and judicial decisions and not publicly 
disparaging judgments; and 
• avoiding themselves engaging in active “judge shopping”.76 
Prosecutors are also advised of the importance of “fairness, 
moderation, and dignity” accompanying “vigorous and thorough 
prosecutions.”77 
Prosecutors’ obligations under provincial and federal guidelines 
are purportedly subject to enforcement through internal disciplinary 
processes, although the nature and extent of that enforcement is 
unknown. 
Law society codes of conduct provide minimal specific direction 
to prosecutors. The general duty imposed on prosecutors to “act for the 
public and the administration of justice resolutely and honorably within 
the limits of the law while treating the tribunal with candor, fairness, 
courtesy and respect” is nearly identical to the obligations imposed on 
all lawyers when acting as advocates, except that prosecutors “act for 
the public and the administration of justice” instead of “represent the 
client.”78 The codes go on to add in the commentary: 
When engaged as a prosecutor, the lawyer’s primary duty is not to 
seek to convict but to see that justice is done through a fair trial on 
the merits. The prosecutor exercises a public function involving 
much discretion and power and must act fairly and dispassionately. 
The prosecutor should not do anything that might prevent the 
accused from being represented by counsel or communicating with 
counsel and, to the extent required by law and accepted practice, 
should make timely disclosure to defence counsel or directly to an 
unrepresented accused of all relevant and known facts and 
witnesses, whether tending to show guilt or innocence.79 
As Woolley has noted elsewhere, however, the duties identified 
in the commentary “seem largely to be a context-specific iteration of 
general principles requiring all lawyers to comply with their legal and 
constitutional obligations.”80 Further, provincial law societies almost 
never discipline prosecutors. Of 2,200 disciplinary decisions issued by 
 
76. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, supra note 18, at §2.3. 
77. Id.at §2.2.2. 
78.  FED. OF L. SOCIETIES, MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 5.1-3, 5.1-1. The 
Federation’s Code has been substantially adopted in all Canadian provinces, including this rule. 
79. Id. at r. 5.1-3, cmt 1. 
80. WOOLLEY, supra note 14, at §9.96. 
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the Law Society of Ontario81 over a twenty-three year period, only nine 
involved prosecutors.82 Databases containing law society disciplinary 
decisions reveal only a handful addressing the conduct of 
prosecutors.83 
By far the most significant source of guidance and regulation of 
prosecutors arises from judicial decisions. Courts have established the 
overarching duty of Canadian prosecutors, like their American 
counterparts, to seek justice: “His duty is not so much to obtain a 
conviction as to assist the judge and jury in ensuring that the fullest 
possible justice is done;”84 “[t]he role of prosecutor excludes any 
notion of winning or losing.”85 As in the United States, that duty is 
poorly explained, inherently ambiguous and more a source of judicial 
platitudes than rigorous explanation of a prosecutor’s duties in a 
criminal trial.86 
However, courts have attempted to set out a prosecutor’s duties 
with respect to the conduct of a criminal matter, particularly in relation 
to disclosure,87 making statements to the court (including to a jury),88 
cross-examining witnesses,89 the presentation of evidence,90 treatment 
 
81.  The Law Society of Upper Canada changed its name in 2017 to the Law Society of 
Ontario. See Joseph Brean, Law Society to drop ‘Upper Canada’ from its name after report calls 
it elitist and offensive, NATIONAL POST (Sept. 29, 2017), http://nationalpost.com/
news/canada/law-society-to-drop-upper-canada [https://perma.cc/6SWS-SQCN]. 
82.  Jennifer Paglioro & Jayme Poisson, Ontario fails to track complaints against Crown 
attorneys, TORONTO STAR (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.thestar.com/news/queenspark/
2014/12/16/ontario_fails_to_track_complaints_against_crown_attorneys.html 
[https://perma.cc/WJW4-HADG]. 
83.  See generally, WOOLLEY, supra note 14, at §§9.100, 9.87-9.92. 
84.  R. v. Boucher, [1955] S.C.R. 16, 21 (Can.). 
85.  Id. at 24. See also R. v. Swietlinski, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 481, 494-95 (Can.); R. v. Regan, 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, ¶ 155-56 (Can.) (Binnie, J., dissenting on other grounds). 
86.  See Woolley, supra note 13. 
87. See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326, at 2 (Can.). 
88. See, e.g., Boucher, [1955] S.C.R., at 2384 (Can.); R. v. Manasseri, (2016) O.R. 3d 401, 
¶ 103-04 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
89. See R. v. Ahmed, [2015] O.A.C. 751, para. 39 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Lagiacco, [1984], 
11 C.C.C. 3d 374, 383-84 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
90. See, e.g., R. v. Cook, [1997] S.C.R. 1113, 1114-15 (Can.); R. v. Hillis, 2016 CanLII 
451, para. 20 (Can. Ont.); R. v. MacInnis, [2007] 163 C.R.R. 2d 111 (ONSCJ) (Can.); R. v. 
Zelitt, 2003 CanLII 2 (Can. Alta.). 
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of self-represented accused,91 jury selection,92 consenting to trial by 
judge alone,93 the handling of witnesses,94 the treatment of accused 
charged from the same incident,95 and the Crown’s defense of a 
publication ban.96 
Despite this, Courts have also made it clear that Canadian 
prosecutors enjoy considerable independence from judicial oversight. 
While courts will assess whether a prosecutor’s conduct of a matter has 
undermined trial fairness such that a new trial or other relief for the 
accused is warranted, they defer to counsel decisions on strategy.97 In 
addition, they will not ordinarily review a prosecutor’s exercise of 
discretion about whether and how to proceed against the accused. A 
court will only review an exercise of prosecutorial discretion ex ante 
where there has been an abuse of process or, ex post, where the tort of 
malicious prosecution is made out. To be an abuse of process, the 
prosecutor must have acted in a way “that is egregious and seriously 
compromises trial fairness and/or the integrity of the justice system.”98 
The accused must establish a “proper evidentiary foundation” for the 
claim of abuse of process,99 and courts will presume that “prosecutorial 
discretion is exercised in good faith.”100 To establish malicious 
prosecution, a former accused must show, amongst other things, that 
the prosecutor “deliberately intended to subvert or abuse the office of 
the Attorney General or the process of criminal justice”;101 mere 
 
91. R. v. Burns, [1993] 136 N.B.R. 2d 166 (CACA Can.); R v. Vu, [2004] O.T.C. 1196 
(ONSCJ) (Can.). 
92. See, e.g., R. v. Biddle, [1995] S.C.R. 761, para. 50 (Can.) (Gonthier, J., concurring); 
R. v. Gayle, (2001), O.R. 3d 36 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Bain, [1992] S.C.R. 91, 93-94 (Can.). 
93. See, e.g., R. v. Bird, (1996) Alta. L.R. 3d 128 (Can. Alta.), 185 A.R. 201 (QB); R. v. 
Effert, (2008) Atla. L.R. 4th 200 (Can. Atla.). 
94. See R. v. Spackman, 2009 CanLII 37920, 64 (Can. Ont.). 
95. R. v. Lacroix, [2007] ONCJ 540 (Can.). 
96. R. v. Brown (L.A.), [1988] 126 C.C.C. 3d 187 (Ont. Gen. Div.). For a more detailed 
discussion of the law governing prosecutors, see Woolley, supra note 13,  at 800-10. 
97. See R. v. Anderson, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167, para. 60 (Can.). The Supreme Court has held 
that courts have the power to “penalize counsel for ignoring rulings or orders, or for 
inappropriate behaviour such as tardiness, incivility, abusive cross-examination, improper 
opening or closing addresses or inappropriate attire. Sanctions may include orders to comply, 
adjournments, extensions of time, warnings, cost awards, dismissals, and contempt proceedings” 
Id. at ¶ 58.  
98. See Anderson, [2014] S.C.R., at ¶ 50. 
99. See R. v. Nixon, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566, at ¶ 60 (Can.).  
100. Anderson, [2014] S.C.R., at ¶ 55.  
101. Miazga v. Kvello Estate, [2009] S.C.R. 339, at ¶ 89 (Can.) (emphasis added). 
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“incompetence, inexperience, poor judgment, lack of professionalism, 
recklessness, honest mistake, negligence, or even gross negligence” is 
insufficient.102 
Canadian courts have, however, been willing to hold the state 
liable for violation of an accused’s constitutional rights. Section 24(1) 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter”) permits 
the Court to grant “such remedy as the court considers appropriate and 
just in the circumstances” for a violation of a person’s Charter rights or 
freedoms. In a recent case, Ivan Henry was awarded $8 million in 
Charter damages following his wrongful conviction and twenty-seven 
years imprisonment that resulted from a trial in which the Crown 
showed a “shocking disregard” for his Charter rights.103 In addition, 
courts have ordered costs against the Crown in response to a Charter 
violation, Crown misconduct or similarly serious circumstances; to 
justify costs there must be a “‘marked and unacceptable departure from 
the reasonable standards expected of the prosecution’, or something 
that is ‘rare’ or ‘unique’ that ‘must at least result in something akin to 
an extreme hardship on the defendant.’”104 
Canadian prosecutors thus have a general duty to seek justice, as 
well more specified obligations as set out in the federal and provincial 
policy manuals, and in case law. Prosecutors are, however, subject to 
next to no risk of personal regulatory consequences, except as may 
occur outside of the public eye in the form of discipline by their 
employers. 
Nonetheless, Canadian prosecutors do from time to time engage 
in misconduct. As in the United States, while troubling prosecutorial 
conduct may not be the sole factor in creating wrongful convictions, it 
has been a factor in most (and perhaps all) wrongful conviction cases 
in Canada.105 Case law also reveals prosecutors who did the following: 
 
102. Id. at ¶ 81. “In cases subsequent to Miazga, courts have shown themselves reluctant 
to even hear claims for wrongful conviction, frequently striking them out or dismissing them, 
often because the claiming party would not be able to establish malice.” WOOLEY, supra note 
14, §9.59. For a more fulsome discussion of how Canadian courts review prosecutorial 
discretion, see id. at §9.43, §9.59. 
103. Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen.), (2016) B.C.S.C. 1038, ¶¶ 472-73 (Can. 
B.C.); see Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen.), [2015] S.C.R 214 (Can.). 
104. R. v. Singh, [2016] ONCA 108, ¶ 38 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (quoting R. v Ciarniello, [2006] 
O.R. 561 (Can. Ont. C.A). 
105. See Miazga, [2009] S.C.R. 51, at ¶ 89; see also Royal Commission on the Donald 
Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Digest of Findings and Recommendations (Dec. 1989) (finding that 
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failed to satisfy their duty to disclose, sometimes in a serious way;106 
coached their witnesses or asked improper leading questions of their 
own witnesses;107 improperly curated evidence (for example, by not 
calling a witness after it became clear that some of the witness’s 
evidence would help the accused);108 conducted abusive, belligerent, 
sarcastic, or demeaning cross-examination or asked questions going to 
irrelevant or inadmissible matters;109 and made improper and 
inflammatory statements or statements which introduced irrelevant or 
inadmissible issues to the court.110 
 
the prosecutor did not interview witnesses who had given contradictory statements or disclose 
those statements to the defense); MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT OF THE 
KAUFMAN COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN (1998) (relating to 
reliance on jailhouse informants, lack of disclosure and prosecutorial tunnel vision); David 
Asper, “No One’s Interested in Something You Didn’t Do”: Freeing David Milgaard the Ugly 
Way, in IN SEARCH OF THE ETHICAL LAWYER: STORIES FROM THE CANADIAN LEGAL 
PROFESSION 55-80 (Adam Dodek & Alice Woolley eds., UBC Press 2016). 
106. See, e.g., R. v. Illes, [2008] S.C.R. 57; R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.R. 307; R. v. La, 
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 680 (Can.); R. v. Wood, (2006) ABCA 343 (Can. Alta. C.A.); R. v. Bain (K.), 
[2005] 196 O.A.C. 81 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. O’Grady, (1995) 64 B.C.A.C. 111 (Can. B.C. 
C.A.); R. v. S.E.L., 2012 ABQB 190 (Can. Alta. Q.B.); R. v. MacInnis, [2007] 163 C.R.R. (2d) 
111 (Can. Ont. S.C.). 
107. See, e.g., R. v. Paquette, (2008) ABCA 49 (Can. Alta. C.A.); R. v. Situ, (2005) ABCA 
275 (Can. Alta. C.A.); R. v. Rose, [2001] 153 C.C.C. 3d 225 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Peruta, 
[1992] 78 C.C.C. 3d 350 (Can. Quebec C.A.); R. v. Spence, [2011] ONSC 2406 (Can. Ont. 
S.C.J.). 
108.  See R. v. Hillis, [2016] ON 451 (Can. Ont. S.C.). 
109. See, e.g., R. v. A.G., [2015] ONCA 159, ¶ 43 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (finding cross-
examination improper but denying a new trial because “the cross-examination at issue did not 
result in a miscarriage of justice”); R. v. Gahan, (2014) NBJ No 77 (Can. C.A.); R. v. Bear, 
(2008) SKCA 172 (Can. Saskatchewan C.A.); R. v. Ellard, (2003) BCCA 68 (Can. B.C. C.A.); 
R. v. Wojcik, (2002) MBCA 82 (Can. Manitoba C.A.); R. v. Shell, [2002] O.J. No. 3633 (Can. 
C.A.); R. v. Rose, [2001] 153 C.C.C. 3d 225 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Henderson, (1999) 44 O.R. 
3d 628 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Riche, (1996) NJ No. 293 (Can. Nfld. C.A.); R. v. Bricker, [1994] 
90 C.C.C. 3d 268 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Walker, [1994] 90 C.C.C. 3d 144 (Can. Ont. C.A); R. 
v. Hillier, (1994) 115 Nfld & PEIR 27 (Can. N.L. C.A.); R. v. R. (A.J.), [1994] 94 C.C.C. 3d 
168 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Daly, [1992] 57 O.A.C. 70 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (finding improper cross-
examination with sarcasm and editorializing did not warrant new trial); R. v. Logiacco, [1984] 
2 O.A.C. 177 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Stewart, [1991] 43 O.A.C. 109 (Can. Ont. C.A.). See also 
R. v. Robinson, [2001] 153 C.C.C. 3d 398, ¶ 35 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (noting the cross-examination 
had many “questions . . . laced with sarcasm and framed in a manner that made it apparent that 
Crown counsel personally held the appellant in utter contempt . . . [and] an attempt at character 
assassination”). Robinson subsequently committed an extremely violent sexual assault for which 
he was convicted. R. v. Robinson, [2006] 212 C.C.C. 3d 439 (Can. Ont. C.A.)).  
110.  R. v. Boucher, [1955] S.C.R. 16, 23 (Can.); R. v. A.T., [2015] ONCA 65 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.); R. v. Delisle, [2013] QCCA 952 (Can. Que. C.A.); R. v. Mallory, [2007] ONCA 46 (Can. 
Ont. C.A.); R. v. Carter, (2005) BCCA 381 (Can. B.C. C.A.); R. v. White, [1997] 99 O.A.C. 1 
(Can. Ont. C.A.); Hillier, (1994) 115 Nfld & PEIR; R. v. Peruta, [1992] 51 C.A.Q. 79 (Can. 
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Far less evidence exists to suggest that Canadian prosecutors 
engage in misconduct in relation to charging or the negotiation of plea 
bargains. There are some cases that suggest there may be issues of 
concern. In Grenier v. R., the accused had asked to take a polygraph. 
Despite the fact that polygraph evidence is inadmissible and of 
questionable reliability, the prosecutor made a plea offer in which if the 
accused passed a polygraph the charges would be dropped, but if the 
accused failed the polygraph he would either have to plead guilty or 
forego representation by his present counsel.111 In R. v. Delchev the 
prosecutor offered a plea to an accused on the condition that the 
accused both admit that he lied during a preliminary inquiry, and that 
his lawyer had known that he was lying.112 The Ontario Court of 
Appeal ordered a new trial in Delchev to allow the trial judge to 
consider whether this was an abuse of process; the Court viewed this 
conduct as improperly interfering with the relationship between the 
accused and his counsel. In general, however, there are fewer 
opportunities for Canadian prosecutors to abuse the plea bargaining 
process than exist in the United States. Very few crimes in Canada 
attract significant mandatory minimum sentences and there is no death 
penalty.113 When, for example, Canada introduced new mandatory 
minimum penalties for drug offences where an aggravating factor was 
present (for example, where it involved a weapon, violence or a youth) 
the mandatory minimum penalties range from nine months to three 
years.114 While this gives the prosecutor some leverage, it is not 
particularly consequential. In addition, while legal aid in Canada is not 
as well funded as it used to be, and the right to counsel is not as robustly 
protected as would be ideal, a person accused of a serious crime is still 
likely to be represented by competent counsel.115 Bail is also relatively 
 
Que. C.A.); R. v. Suarez-Noa, [2015] ONSC 3823 (Can. Ont. S.C.); R. v. Sun, [2002] O.J. No. 
2166 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Griffin, [1993] O.J. No. 2573, ¶¶. 25-31 (Can. Ont. C.J. Gen. 
Div.); R. v. Porter, [1992] O.J. No. 2931 (Can. Ont. C.J. Gen. Div). 
111.  For reasons that seem unconvincing, the Court did not find this to be improper 
conduct. Grenier v. R., (2014) NB 68 (Can. N.B. Q.B.). For a discussion of the case, see 
Woolley, supra note 13.  
112.  See R. v. Delchev, [2015] ONCA 381, ¶ 67 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
113.  See 6.2 Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Particular Drug Offences Under the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, PUB. PROSECUTION SERV. OF CANADA (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/p6/ch02.html 
[https://perma.cc/UAT4-EDFP]. 
114.  Id. 
115. See R. v. Rowbotham, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 463 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
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easier to obtain in Canada, and the Supreme Court of Canada has 
imposed strict limits on the time the Crown can take in bringing a 
matter to trial before charges will be thrown out (although being in 
remand in Canada could still incentivize an accused to agree to a 
plea).116 
Plea bargaining is a robust part of Canadian criminal justice, but 
an accused who goes to trial cannot risk the sorts of consequences 
suffered by American accused like Weldon Angelos, a petty marijuana 
dealer sentenced to fifty-five years’ incarceration.117 A Canadian 
prosecutor lacks the systemic power of an American prosecutor in 
relation to plea negotiations. 
That is not to suggest that Canada’s criminal justice system is free 
of systemic injustice. Canada incarcerates indigenous people at a rate 
far in excess of non-indigenous peoples.118 Marie Manikis has argued 
that Canadian prosecutors ought to, as a matter of professional duty, be 
required to prosecute cases in light of law that ameliorates the sentences 
of indigenous offenders.119 The less punitive nature of Canadian 
criminal law simply softens the impact of that injustice relative to 
America. 
IV. FRANCE 
The French criminal justice system is rooted in the inquisitorial 
model of criminal procedure.120 Under this model, a neutral judicial 
 
116.  See, e.g., R. v. Cody, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 659 (Can.); R. v. Antic, [2017] S.C.R. 509 
(Can.) (explaining requirements for judicial interim release); R. v. Jordan, 2016 S.C.R. 631 
(Can.).  
117.  See Luna & Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, supra note 9, at 1422. The one place where 
a prosecutor would have some serious leverage is if an accused committed multiple homicides, 
given that Canadian law now permits consecutive mandatory minimum sentences (i.e., a 
potential mandatory sentence of seventy-five years for a triple homicide). 
118.  Backgrounder: Aboriginal Offenders – A Critical Situation, OFF. OF THE 
CORRECTIONAL INVESTIGATOR (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/oth-aut/oth-
aut20121022info-eng.aspx [https://perma.cc/UYE6-GEJF]. 
119.  See Marie Manikis, Towards Accountability and Fairness for Aboriginal People: The 
Recognition of Gladue as a Principle of Fundamental Justice That Applies to Prosecutors, 21 
CANADIAN CRIM. L. REV. 173 (2016). 
120.  The terms ‘inquisitorial’ and ‘adversarial’ are imperfect and some scholars have 
criticized the extensive use of these categories in comparative criminal justice. See, e.g., 
Máximo Langer, The Long Shadow of the Adversarial and Inquisitorial Categories, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014), 
available at http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199673599.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199673599-e-39 [https://perma.cc/CU5E-CCPP]; 
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officer is tasked with carrying out an official investigation into the 
crime to establish the truth. By contrast, in the adversarial model, each 
party conducts its own inquiry and presents its findings to a passive 
adjudicator.121 Inquisitorial roots explain the normative claims 
underpinning the role of public prosecutors in French criminal 
procedure. The juge d’instruction (the investigative judge) is usually 
presented as the paradigmatic example of the neutral judicial officer in 
the French inquisitorial procedure: Article 81 of the  Code de procedure 
pénale (Code of Criminal Procedure) (“CPP”) states that the juge 
d’instruction “undertakes in accordance with the law any investigative 
step he deems useful for the discovery of the truth. He seeks out 
evidence of innocence as well as guilt.”122 Yet, in practice, less than 
two percent of cases are dealt with in this way.123 The vast majority of 
cases are nowadays investigated by the police under the supervision of 
another judicial officer, the public prosecutor. 
Procureurs belong to the magistrature (the French career-trained 
judiciary) along with trial judges and juges d’instruction. Magistrats 
can and do switch between roles throughout their career. As magistrats, 
French public prosecutors are required to act in and uphold the public 
interest. When supervising police investigations, procureurs must 
therefore ensure that evidence of innocence as well as guilt is collected. 
Furthermore, they have an important role as guarantors of individual 
freedoms as they supervise the period of police detention, called the 
garde à vue (“GAV”). This role flows from Article 66 of the 
Constitution which proclaims: “No one shall be arbitrarily detained. 
The judicial authority, guardian of the freedom of the individual, shall 
ensure compliance with this principle in the conditions laid down by 
 
John D. Jackson, The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Towards 
Convergence, Divergence or Realignment?, 68 MOD. L. REV. 737, 737–64 (2005). However, 
the traditional distinction remains useful to explain fundamental differences between legal 
cultures as each system remains rooted in its own tradition, even though no system is a pure 
representation of one model or the other. 
121.  See Mirjan Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of 
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 506–89 (1973). 
122.  Code de procédure pénale [C. com] [Criminal Procedure Code], art. 81 (Fr.). 
123.  Calculated as a percentage of cases proceeded with by public prosecutors (i.e. 
including prosecutions and alternatives to prosecution), 16,772 cases out of 1,110,952 were sent 
to the juge d’instruction (around 1.51%, or 2.89% of prosecuted cases) in 2015. See LES 
CHIFFRES-CLÉFS DE LA JUSTICE 2016, MINISTÈRE DE LA JUSTICE 14 (2016), available at 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/stat_CC%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XP4-EVWZ]. 
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statute.”124 The Conseil constitutionnel (French constitutional court) 
has repeated on a number of occasions that the “judicial authority” 
included both judges and public prosecutors.125 
Ethical rules compiled by the High Council for the Judiciary apply 
to both judges and prosecutors. Paragraph C.41 insists on the 
impartiality that should characterize procureurs’ decisions: “[i]n all 
their professional activities and particularly when directing 
investigations and supervising police officers’ activities, prosecutors 
shall endeavor to objectively seek evidence that will establish the 
truth,”126 which clearly excludes seeking to obtain a conviction at all 
costs. 
These normative claims also form part of the rhetoric used by 
public prosecutors themselves to describe their role. A public 
prosecutor Soubise interviewed for her doctoral study127 described his 
role as such: “We must be impartial and I lay claim [je revendique]128 
to the procureur’s impartiality up until the moment he stands up to 
speak at trial . . . where he asks for a sentence, where he asks for the 
defendant to be found guilty and to be sentenced.”129  
Crucially, the status of magistrat afforded to procureurs has 
practical consequences on French criminal procedure. Most 
importantly, the role of the defense lawyer is greatly diminished, in 
comparison to its Anglo-American counterparts.130 Since the 
 
124. 1958 CONST. art. 66 (Fr.). 
125. See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 93-326 DC, 
du 11 août 1993, Jan. 4, 1993, at ¶ 5 (Fr.), available at www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/
decision/1993/93326dc.htm [https://perma.cc/C5CR-FW45]; Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] 
[Constitutional Court] decision No. 2004-492 DC du 2 mars 2004, Mar. 2, 2004, at ¶ 98 (Fr.), 
available at www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2004/2004492dc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TKW9-LQJJ]; Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision 
No.2010-14/22 QPC du 30 juillet 2010, July 30, 2010, at ¶ 26 (Fr.), available at www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/decision/2010/201014_22qpc.htm [https://perma.cc/W797-5TWK]. 
126.  Compendium of the Judiciary’s Ethical Obligations, ¶ C.41 (2010) (Fr.). 
127. Soubise observed the work of procureurs at a medium court center for two months 
in 2013 and carried out semi-structured interviews with nine prosecutors for her 2016 doctoral 
study. Soubise coded her interviews with the letters “FR” for France and a number.  
128.  “Je revendique” can be translated in several ways: to claim or to lay claim to, but also 
to demand something and/or to affirm/assert it. 
129.  Interview respondent FR8.  
130.  See JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE 
ACCOUNT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE 102 (Hart 
Publishing 2005); Daniel Soulez-Larivière, Le problème du ministère public francais, AJ PÉNAL 
112 (2011); Stewart Field & Andrew West, Dialogue and the Inquisitorial Tradition: French 
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investigation is supervised by a magistrat and is supposed to have 
collected both incriminatory and exculpatory evidence, its findings are 
perceived as particularly trustworthy. According to inquisitorial 
principles, there is no need for a parallel investigation by the defense, 
as would be expected in an adversarial system. The case file forms the 
centerpiece of the trial: it is read by trial judges prior to the hearing and 
judges use the evidence included in the file as a basis to question the 
defendant. It is rare for witnesses to be called at the trial since their 
statements can simply be read from the file.131 It is particularly difficult 
for defense lawyers to challenge the results of the judicial inquiry, 
given their perceived bias in favor of their client, as opposed to the 
supposedly neutral judicial investigation.132 
The role of ensuring a fair and accurate assessment of guilt 
theoretically played by procureurs justified, until recently, the fact that 
defense lawyers were not permitted to advise suspects at the police 
station or to attend police interrogations. Since due process rights of 
suspects were supposed to be guaranteed by the prosecutor, there was 
no need—the argument went—for defense lawyers. The participation 
of defense lawyers in pre-trial investigations has slowly developed, in 
particular due to the influence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”).133 
Their status of magistrats also justifies the central role played by 
procureurs in French criminal procedure. Not only do they decide 
whether to and on what charge to prosecute a case, but they can also 
divert the case to an alternative to prosecution or choose which 
procedural pathway (e.g., guilty plea, speedy on-file procedure, 
traditional trial, etc.) to use. In recent years, their status as a magistrat 
has justified the transfer of powers from judges to procureurs in order 
 
Defence Lawyers in the Pre-Trial Criminal Process, 14 CRIM. L. F. 261, 216-316 (2003); 
Stewart Field, Judicial Supervision and the Pre-Trial Process, 21 J. L. SOC. 119, 119-35 (1994). 
131.  A different procedure applies for serious crimes, such as rape and homicide. Cases 
involving defendants accused of those serious offenses are heard by the Cour d’assises, the only 
criminal court involving a jury of citizens in the French legal system. Unlike in less serious 
cases, witnesses are called before the Cour d’assises. 
132.  See Jacqueline Hodgson, The Role of the Criminal Defence Lawyer in an Inquisitorial 
Procedure: Legal and Ethical Constraints, 9 LEGAL ETHICS 125–44 (2006); Field & West, 
supra, note 130 at 296–97. 
133.  See JODIE BLACKSTOCK ET AL., INSIDE POLICE CUSTODY: AN EMPIRICAL ACCOUNT 
OF SUSPECTS’ RIGHTS IN FOUR JURISDICTIONS (2014); Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, “North of 
the Border and Across the Channel”: Custodial Legal Assistance Reforms in Scotland and 
France, CRIM. L. REV. 369, 369–84 (2013). 
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to speed up the criminal justice process. The ordonnance pénale is a 
procedure in which the judge makes a decision purely on the 
prosecution papers, without a hearing, effectively giving procureur an 
adjudicating function in practice.134 Two new procedures, such as the 
composition pénale (introduced in 1999) and the comparution 
préalable sur reconnaissance de culpabilité (“CRPC”) (introduced in 
2004), even give procureurs sentencing powers as they can offer a 
sentence to defendants who have admitted their guilt.135 All these new 
procedures require the validation of a judge, but the checks have been 
described as “succinct” by researchers.136 However, some French 
scholars have defended these new procedures on the grounds that the 
prosecutor is a magistrat and, as such a “natural defender of freedoms, 
just like judges.”137 
The French criminal justice system, along with other 
inquisitorially based systems, is classically described as relying on 
internal bureaucratic accountability to keep public officials, such as 
procureurs, in check.138 The Ministry of Justice issues circulars which 
define its prosecution priorities or its interpretation of new law. The 
implementation of these national policies is ensured by the centralized 
hierarchy of the French public prosecution service, with the Minister 
of Justice at the top. However, the hierarchical organization of the 
 
134. It should be noted, however, that these new procedures have resulted in formal 
agreements between judges and prosecutors on the type of cases which should be dealt with by 
ordonnance pénale, composition pénale or CRPC. This includes an agreement on the kind of 
sentence that is appropriate in these cases. Thus, although judges have lost decision-making 
power, they have regained some of it ahead of the decision to prosecute. See, e.g., S. Grunvald, 
Les choix et schémas d’orientation, in 4 LA REPONSE PENALE DIX ANS DE TRAITEMENT DES 
DELITS 109–10 (J. Danet ed., 2013) ; Vanessa Perrocheau, La Composition Pénale et La 
Comparution Sur Reconnaissance de Culpabilité : Quelles Limites à l’omnipotence Du 
Parquet?, in 1 DROIT ET SOCIETE 55 (2010) ; Jean Danet & Sylvie Grunvald, Brèves Remarques 
Tirées d’une Première Évaluation de La Composition Pénale, in AJ PENAL 196 (2004); Jean-
Daniel Régnault, Composition Pénale : L’exemple Du Tribunal de Cambrai, in AJ PENAL 55 
(2003). 
135.  See generally Laurene Soubise, Guilty Pleas in an Inquisitorial Setting – An 
Empirical Study of France, J. L. & SOC’Y, 398, 398-426 (2018). 
136. Claire Saas, De la composition pénale au plaider-coupable: le pouvoir de sanction 
du procureur, REV. SCI. CRIM. & COMP. L. 827, 827-43 (2004). 
137. Jean Pradel, Défense du plaidoyer de culpabilité. À propos du projet de loi sur les 
évolutions de la criminalité, SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, 169, 169–71 (2004). 
138. For a classic account, see MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE 
AUTHORITY:  A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986); see also Ronald F. 
Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH & 
LEE L. REV. 1587, 1587-620 (2010). 
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French prosecution service is characterized by a system of loyalty and 
trust rather than strict orders demanding disciplined obedience. 
Moreover, ministerial circulars often limit themselves to broad 
principles and relatively vague targets, allowing for wide prosecutorial 
discretion in practice.139 
Although the professional ethos and ethical rules emphasize a 
neutral attitude for prosecutors, the behavior of prosecutors in practice 
does not match these aspirations. Empirical research has showed that 
the relationship between police investigators and procureurs is 
characterized by mutual trust, rather than by checks and close 
monitoring. Mouhanna noted the strong interdependence which exists 
between police investigators and procureurs.140 Public prosecutors are 
largely office-based and therefore depend on the police for any 
information, while police officers need procureurs as the police’s own 
legal powers are limited.141 Mouhanna thus observed a relationship of 
trust between police and prosecutors, based on a shared objective of 
putting together procedurally strong cases, i.e., legally solid cases 
which cannot be taken apart by defense lawyers.142 The importance of 
trust has been reinforced by the introduction of traitement en temps réel 
(real time processing) where procureurs receive reports from police 
investigators over the phone.143 In Soubise’s own research, one 
procureur confirmed the importance of trust in supervising police 
investigations: 
A lot of things are actually based on trust. Phone duty has taken 
such proportions, that it’s obvious that it cannot be managed 
without trust. If every time we have a case, we ask for the file to 
be sent to us by post, so that we can check what’s in it, because we 
don’t trust the officer who is reporting to us, it becomes 
unmanageable!144  
 
139. See Hodgson & Soubise, supra note 19. 
140. See generally Christian Mouhanna, Les relations police-parquet en France: un 
partenariat mis en cause?, 58 DROIT SOCIETE 505 (2004). 
141. For instance, although police officers can decide to detain a person at the police 
station, the procureur can order her immediate release or refuse to extend the detention period 
over twenty-four hours. 
142. CHRISTIAN MOUHANNA, POLICES JUDICIAIRES ET MAGISTRATS : UNE AFFAIRE DE 
CONFIANCE (2001); Mouhanna, supra note 140. 
143. BENOIT BASTARD & CHRISTIAN MOUHANNA, UNE JUSTICE DANS L’URGENCE: LE 
TRAITEMENT EN TEMPS REEL DES AFFAIRES PENALES (2007). 
144.  Interview respondent FR2. 
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Procureurs are therefore primarily concerned with the formal 
conformity of the case file to due process safeguards, rather than their 
actual application. For instance, they can check that the police have 
properly recorded that they have informed the suspect of his rights, but 
they do not check how and in which circumstances this notification has 
been done. 
Furthermore, Hodgson found that a crime control perspective 
often infused procureurs’ understanding of “the public interest.” For 
instance, she observed that procureurs frequently extend the police 
detention period over twenty-four hours to put pressure on suspects to 
confess.145 This was confirmed by Soubise’s own, more recent, 
observations where a procureur told the police that he was going to 
extend the police detention while commenting “you need to work him 
up.  . . .  Carry on questioning him late tonight and early tomorrow 
morning.”146 In another case where the police carried out an illegal 
house search in which they seized a computer, the procureur 
considered trying to keep the computer as evidence, in the hope that the 
defense would not raise the illegality of the search before deciding to 
return the computer to the suspect and ask whether he would agree to 
let the police examine it.147 This behavior is clearly at odds with the 
image of neutral judicial officer linked to the status of magistrat and 
suggests that defense of the defendant’s interests is actually seen as the 
responsibility of the defense lawyer, rather than that of the prosecutor. 
It is interesting to note that the procureur decided to act in conformity 
with the ethos of magistrats in the end, although it remains unclear 
whether this could partly be explained by the presence of the 
researcher, as well as a trainee magistrat at the time. 
Although these examples suggest a conviction mindset, there is 
little evidence that French prosecutors engage in similar misconduct to 
that of American or Canadian prosecutors. Several reasons can account 
for that. First, procureurs have different powers from adversarial 
prosecutors. Although they can require the police to interview a 
particular witness, all witness statements are automatically added to the 
case file and prosecutors do not have the possibility to select witnesses 
whose accounts fit the prosecution case. Similarly, French prosecutors 
do not have the power to select the evidence which should be disclosed 
 
145. Hodgson, supra note 10 at 171–77. 
146.  Case F-47 (on file with author).  
147.  Case F-49 (on file with author).  
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to the defense as the dossier of evidence must be disclosed in full. As 
witnesses are often absent from court, witness coaching or aggressive 
cross-examination are unlikely to be an issue either. The interrogation 
of the defendant (or any other witness present) is principally conducted 
by the trial judge and prosecutors can merely ask additional questions 
afterwards. However, French public prosecutors have been disciplined 
for making inflammatory or racist statements to the court, for instance 
by linking the belonging of the defendant to the travelers’ community 
to a criminal lifestyle.148 
Second, although procureurs’ decisions are recorded on file—
mostly by the police who note that they are acting in accordance with 
the procureur’s instructions—there is no recording of the reasons that 
have led to the decision. This absence of reasons is in line with the 
dominant perception in French legal culture that the application of the 
law is an objective task leading to a logical conclusion and, therefore, 
there is no need to detail the reasoning behind it,149 but it is also an 
obstacle to any in-depth review of procureurs’ decisions. Audits 
therefore remain rare in the French criminal justice system and have 
been limited to miscarriages of justice, such as the Outreau case in 
which thirteen out of seventeen defendants were acquitted (seven in 
first instance and six on appeal) in 2004-05, after having spent several 
years in pre-trial detention. A working party was immediately set up by 
the Ministry of Justice,150 followed by a parliamentary inquiry.151 Since 
serious and complex cases such as Outreau are dealt with through the 
instruction procedure, the reports and ensuing public debates mainly 
focused on the work of the juge d’instruction in the case, rather than 
the procureur. The reports into the Outreau scandal blamed the 
prosecutor for failures which amounted to negligence rather than 
willful misconduct. The prosecutor in the case was not sanctioned. 
 
148. See P082, CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DE LA MAGISTRATURE (Oct. 13, 2015), 
www.conseil-superieur-magistrature.fr/missions/discipline/p082 [https://perma.cc/7ZYP-
UWPW]; P052, CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DE LA MAGISTRATURE (Jan. 27, 2006), www.conseil-
superieur-magistrature.fr/missions/discipline/p052 [https://perma.cc/K68L-QJH5]. 
149. See JOHN BELL, FRENCH LEGAL CULTURES (2001); JACQUELINE HODGSON, 
FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21-25 (2005); CHRISTOPHE MINCKE, EFFICACITE, EFFICIENCE ET 
LEGITIMITE DEMOCRATIQUE DU MINISTERE PUBLIC: QUAND L’ARBRE CACHE LA FORET 
(2002). 
150.  MINISTERE DE LA JUSTICE, RAPPORT DU GROUPE DE TRAVAIL CHARGE DE TIRER LES 
ENSEIGNEMENTS DUE TRAITEMENT JUDICIAIRE DE L’AFFAIRE DITE ‘D’OUTREAU’ (2005). 
151. PHILIPPE HOUILLON, ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, No. 3125 (June 6, 2006). 
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Crucially, the non-partisan gathering of evidence by the police 
under the authority of the procureur is one of the main safeguards of 
inquisitorial systems against miscarriages of justice. Although defense 
lawyers have been progressively granted a greater role in 
investigations, they are still largely unable to compensate for the 
conviction mindset of the procureur and the resulting imbalance in the 
investigation. There is indeed limited opportunity in French criminal 
procedure to test the evidence presented in the dossier as the result of 
the judicial investigation. Yet, the CSM refuses to examine the way 
prosecutors carry out their duty to conduct an impartial investigation: 
“the determination by the procureur of the tasks to be completed during 
the preliminary investigation comes under his discretionary powers and 
cannot constitute a disciplinary fault, as long as it does not demonstrate 
negligence of a particular gravity or the will to harm the rights of the 
parties.”152 
The status of magistrat performs a crucial legitimizing role for 
procureurs as guarantors of society’s interests, but the sufficiency of 
that perspective is being challenged. The ECtHR ruled that the 
procureur could not be the “competent legal authority” or the “other 
officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power” referred to in the 
first and third paragraphs of Article 5 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (“ECHR”)153 because they do not “offer the requisite 
guarantees of independence from the executive and the parties, which 
precludes [their] subsequent intervention in criminal proceedings on 
 
152. See P058, CONSEIL SUPERIEUR DE LA MAGISTRATURE (July 18, 2008), 
www.conseil-superieur-magistrature.fr/missions/discipline/p058 ([https://perma.cc/NC7W-
DA47]. 
153. European Convention of Human Rights, art. 5, ¶ 1(c); ¶ 3 (1950): 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law: . . .  (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the 
purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion 
of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to 
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so. 
(3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) 
of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by 
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time 
or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for 
trial.  
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behalf of the prosecuting authority.”154 The ECtHR rulings were 
followed by the Cour de cassation155 who recognized that the 
procureur was not a judicial authority within the meaning of Article 5, 
section 3 of the ECHR.156 Despite being anticipated,157 these decisions 
were described as a “judicial earthquake,”158 a “storm,”159 or the 
“sound of the death knell” for the French prosecutor.160 
The idea of a split of the magistrature into two separate 
professional bodies for judges and public prosecutors seems to be 
gaining momentum as a 2010 study found that a majority of defense 
lawyers, but also of judges, wished for a split of the magistrature.161 
The same research found that procureurs were for the most part 
opposed to this, fearing an “Anglo-Saxon” drift, where prosecutors 
 
154. Medvedyev & Others v. France, 2010-III Eu. Ct. H.R. ¶ 124; see Moulin v. France, 
App. 37104/06, ¶ 59 (2010) (ECtHR) available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#
{%22itemid%22:[%22001-101876%22]} [https://perma.cc/96KH-CDRM]; Medvedyev & 
Others v. France, App No. 3394/03, ¶ 61 (2008) (ECtHR.), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87369 [https://perma.cc/QP3E-DQ5J]. 
155. The Cour de cassation is the highest court in the French judiciary. It is not a third 
level of jurisdiction as it does not rule on the merits of a case. When decisions are referred to the 
Cour de Cassation, the Court is merely required to decide whether the law has been correctly 
applied by the lower courts based on the facts. 
156. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec. 15, 2010, 
Bull. crim., no. 207 (Fr.).  
157. Already in 2003, Renucci warned that the procureur might not meet the requirements 
detailed in ECtHR case-law to be the “other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power” 
referred to in the third paragraph of Article 5 of the ECHR. See Jean-François Renucci, Le 
procureur de la République est-il un magistrat au sens de l’article 5, § 3, Conv. EDH ?, RECL. 
DALLOZ 2268 (2003); Jean-François Renucci, Le procureur de la République est-il un 
“magistrat” au sens européen du terme?, in LIBERTES, JUSTICE, TOLERANCE : MELANGES EN 
HOMMAGE AU DOYEN GERARD COHEN-JONATHAN VOL. II. 1345 (2004). His concern was later 
shared by Jean-Paul Jean who argued that this called in favor of a strengthening of the 
prosecutorial independence in France. See Jean-Paul Jean, Le ministère public entre modèle 
jacobin et modèle européen, REV. SCI. CRIMINELLE 670 (2005). 
158. Jean-François Renucci, Un séisme judiciaire : pour la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme, les magistrats du parquet ne sont pas une autorité judiciaire, RECL. DALLOZ 600 
(2009). 
159. Jean-Pierre Marguénaud, Tempête sur le Parquet, REV. SCI. CRIMINELLE 176 (2009). 
160. Frédéric Sudre, Le glas du parquet, SEM. JURID. 2277 (2010). 
161. See PHILIP MILBURN, KATIA KOSTULSKI & DENIS SALAS, LES PROCUREURS, ENTRE 
VOCATION JUDICIARE ET FONCTIONS POLITIQUES 147-48 (2010); see Bertrand Louvel, First 
President of the Cour de Cassation, L’évolution de l’environnement institutionnel du magistrat, 
Speech (Sept. 21, 2015), available at https://www.courdecassation.fr/publications_26/
discours_publications_diverses_
2039/discours_2202/premier_president_7084/ouverture_cadej_ebm_21.09.15_32569.html 
[https://perma.cc/YZ99-8MS6] (remarking on his regret regarding the confusion between 
judicial and executive functions represented by the French parquet). 
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would be reduced to the role of public accusers. They felt that their 
status of magistrat was essential to defend their position.162 Jean-
Claude Marin, the Procureur Général for the Cour de cassation,163 also 
defended the status of public prosecutors as judicial officers, 
comparing their role to that of their foreign counterparts, in a 2016 
speech to the Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature: “The French 
prosecutor is not solely a prosecuting authority, limiting her role to that 
of the accusing party in the criminal trial.”164 In particular, he 
underlined the importance of the role of prosecutors in supervising 
police investigations, by contrast with “many countries, in particular 
Anglo-Saxon, where the police carry out their investigations in a very 
autonomous manner.”165 
In reaction to the ECtHR decisions, recent legislative acts seem 
like attempts by the French legislator to win back the status of judicial 
officer for the procureur. Thus, the Act of July 25, 2013 amended 
Article 31 of the CPP which now proclaims that “the procureur 
exercises the prosecution function and enforces the law in conformity 
with the principle of impartiality which apply to him.” The Act of  June 
3, 2016 carried on the trend with the second paragraph of the new 
Article 39-3 of the CCP which provides that the procureur “ensures 
that [police] investigations aim to the discovery of the truth and seek 
evidence of innocence as well as guilt.” Both amendments underline 
the neutrality of the procureur’s function in supervising the police 
investigation and in deciding whether to prosecute or not. However, it 
is unlikely that these new legislative rules will have much impact in 
practice. As we have seen, both ethical rules and the professional ethos 
of magistrats already defined a neutral role for French public 
prosecutors, but it has failed to translate into practice. 
 
162. MILBURN, KOSTULSKI & SALAS, supra note 161, at 149–51. 
163. The Procureur Général of the Cour de cassation does not prosecute cases. Her most 
important task is to ensure a harmonized interpretation of the law and that the case-law of the 
Court and all lower courts is consistent. The Procureur général acts as public prosecutor only 
in the Cour de justice de la République, competent to hear criminal cases against ministers for 
offences committed in carrying out their duties. 
164. Jean-Claude Marin, Attorney General of the Cour de Cassation, L’indépendance 
statutaire du parquet est-elle compatible avec la définition d’une politique pénale nationale, 
Speech (Sept. 29, 2016), available at https://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG///
JC%20MARIN%20-%20CADEJ%20-%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ5P-PBBG]. 
165. Id. 
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Although legal and ethical rules insist on the duty for prosecutors 
to act impartially, case law traditionally refuses to apply the principle 
of impartiality to public prosecutors, further underlining the 
ambivalence of their role. The Cour de cassation thus decided that the 
procureur “whose role is to support the prosecution [and who] does not 
take part in the judgment of the accused” does not come under the 
provisions of Article 6 of the ECHR which guarantees the right to a fair 
trial, including the right to be tried by an independent and impartial 
tribunal.166 Even after the recent amendment of Article 31 of the CPP, 
the Cour de cassation found that the ground based on the perceived 
partiality of the public prosecutor in a specific case is ineffective, 
because the procureur does not decide on the validity of a criminal 
accusation.167 
The French criminal justice system is not a pure representation of 
the inquisitorial model. Whilst the functions of investigation, 
prosecution and trial used to be concentrated in the hands of a single 
person, the lieutenant criminel,168 some elements of party contest have 
been introduced over the past centuries, such as the office of the public 
prosecutor and the defense lawyer. However, the three functions 
remain linked ideologically and structurally through the common 
professional body of the magistrature. As a result, public prosecutors 
carry out an ambivalent role: representing society, they are tasked with 
enforcing the criminal law against suspected offenders, whilst 
protecting the rights of those same people. In practice, French public 
prosecutors have been unable to discharge these competing roles 
effectively and have increasingly emphasized their role in ensuring 
convictions over protecting the rights of an accused. 
V. COMPARISONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
Prosecutors in America, Canada and France are all subject to the 
seek justice imperative;169 in all three jurisdictions the expectation of 
prosecutors is that they will not seek simply to convict or to “win,” but 
 
166. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec. 10, 1986, 
Bull. crim., no. 370 (Fr.); see André Giudicelli, Principe d’impartialité : comment l’appliquer 
au ministère public ?, 2017 REV. SCI. CRIMINELLE 81, 81–84 (2017). 
167. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Mar. 9, 2016, 
Bull. crim., no. 14-86.7957 (Fr.).  
168. Hodgson, supra note 10 at 68. 
169. See supra, notes 30, 73-83, 118 and accompanying text. 
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will rather take some responsibility for the fairness of the process and 
the accuracy of the verdict.170 The duty in France is articulated and 
understood differently because of the inquisitorial system of justice, 
whereas the Canadian duty mirrors almost exactly its American 
counterpart in seeking to reconcile the dual role of prosecutors in 
deciding whether the evidence and the public interest warrant pursuing 
a matter, and in acting as an adversarial advocate in a criminal trial. As 
in the United States, the Canadian duty is not clearly articulated, and 
its precise implications for what a prosecutor ought to do remain 
unclear. In France, the duty is more clearly expressed as the duty to 
conduct an impartial investigation and therefore to ensure the 
collection of evidence of innocence as well as guilt. However, the 
enforcement of this duty in practice remains problematic. 
All three jurisdictions have issues with prosecutors who fail to live 
up to the seek justice norms to which they are subject.171 Better 
evidence for the existence and significance of prosecutorial misconduct 
exists in Canada and the United States than in France. In both Canada 
and the United States prosecutors have contributed to wrongful 
convictions, and act in ways that undermine the fairness and accuracy 
of trials.172 In France, there has been limited research on the role of 
prosecutors in miscarriages of justice. As in many jurisdictions, 
miscarriages of justice in France tend to be detected for the most 
serious crimes, such as rape and homicide. Since those crimes are 
investigated by an investigative judge (leaving the public prosecutor 
with a limited role), reviews of the criminal justice process following 
these wrongful convictions tend to focus on the judge rather than the 
prosecutor. At the same time, the evidence in France supports the 
suggestion that French prosecutors engage in acts contrary to their role, 
failing in particular to properly oversee and control criminal 
investigations. 
There is no data about the relative prevalence of misconduct in 
Canada as compared to the United States. The comparatively sparse 
commentary on prosecutors in Canada could suggest that prosecutorial 
misconduct occurs less frequently in Canada; however, that sparsity 
could be a product of the deficiencies in Canadian scholarship on legal 
 
170. See supra, notes 30, 73-83, 118 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra, notes 20-30, 33-36, 105-16, 140-47 and accompanying text. 
172.  See supra, Parts II and III.  
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ethics,173 and Canada’s relatively small population, rather than a 
reflection of prosecutorial probity. Having said that, the nature and 
extent of prosecutorial misconduct does vary between the jurisdictions. 
There is relatively little evidence, for example, that Canadian 
prosecutors take advantage of systemic factors to coerce plea 
agreements from an accused.174 Indeed, the lack of severe mandatory 
minimums, the representation of accused in serious cases, the 
requirement to bring a trial forward in a reasonable time, and the easier 
availability of judicial interim release makes it very difficult for a 
Canadian prosecutor to coerce a plea agreement, even were they so 
inclined.175 
The structures in which prosecutors work vary between the 
jurisdictions, to a lesser (e.g., Canada) and greater (e.g., France) 
extent.176 Canadian prosecutors are never elected, but like their 
American counterparts they have responsibility for both decisions 
about whether and how to proceed in a matter, and for conducting a 
trial within an adversarial system.177 French prosecutors are appointed 
judicial officers with a similar status as judges. They are responsible 
for supervising the police investigation and ensure the non-partisan 
collection of evidence in the case dossier which will become the 
centerpiece of any subsequent trial. 
The regulation and oversight of prosecutors across all 
jurisdictions suffers from material gaps.178 In all three jurisdictions the 
guidance given to prosecutors by regulatory bodies is relatively 
minimal.179 All Canadian prosecutors can access policy manuals or 
guidebooks published by their employers on which they can rely, and 
which may shape the cultures of prosecutorial offices.180 In addition, 
case law guides American and Canadian prosecutors regarding their 
 
173. Adam Dodek, Canadian Legal Ethics: A Subject in Search of Scholarship, 50 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 115 (2000); Adam Dodek, Canadian Legal Ethics: Ready for the Twenty-First 
Century at Last, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (2008). 
174. See supra, notes 111-17 and accompanying text. 
175. Id. 
176. See supra, notes 53-61, 65-104, 120-139 and accompanying text. 
177.  See supra, Part III. 
178. See supra, 53-60, 68-102, 122-139 and accompanying text. 
179.  See supra, Parts II-IV. 
180. Some American prosecutors also have policy manuals, although by no means all. It 
should be noted that even with policy manuals and guidebooks, practices can very between 
different prosecutor offices in Canada. See Glen Luther, The Frayed and Tarnished Silver 
Thread: Stinchcombe and the Role of Crown Counsel in Alberta, 40 ALBERTA L. REV. 567 
(2002). 
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prosecutorial duties—identifying behavior that is properly 
characterized as misconduct and the constraints that apply to 
prosecutors in the conduct of a trial. At the same time, however, courts 
grant both Canadian and American prosecutors almost unfettered 
independence in relation to their decisions about whether and in what 
way to bring forward a prosecution, and they also defer to prosecutors 
on matters of trial strategy. In France, the main source of prosecutorial 
guidance is the Code of Criminal Procedure, complemented by 
circulars from the Ministry of Justice, as well as broad ethical 
guidelines from the Higher Council for the Judiciary. However, 
although procureurs are theoretically accountable to their hierarchy 
and, ultimately, to parliament through the Minister of Justice, they 
enjoy a wide degree of discretion and rarely have to give reasons for 
their decisions in practice. Importantly, in no jurisdiction do 
prosecutors risk meaningful personal consequences when they engage 
in misconduct.181 
What follows from these comparative observations in relation to 
the proposals for addressing prosecutorial misconduct that arise in the 
American literature—reforming the “do justice” imperative, improving 
regulation of prosecutors or changing the structure or culture in which 
prosecutors work?182 
In our view, looking at the United States, Canada and France 
suggests that structural and systemic factors have the most significant 
impact on the nature and extent of prosecutorial misconduct. While 
misconduct occurs in all three jurisdictions, both the similarities and 
the differences in that misconduct seem directly related to similarities 
and differences between how prosecutors work in the different 
jurisdictions. Canadian and French prosecutors are less likely to abuse 
decisions on whether and how to proceed against a criminal accused 
because doing so is not usually possible. On the other hand, both 
American and Canadian prosecutors do from time to time engage in 
unduly adversarial conduct in a trial. That seems likely to reflect their 
shared structural obligation to act as adversarial advocates; if we want 
prosecutors to be adversarial advocates, it is unsurprising that, from 
time to time, some of them will take that obligation too far. In France, 
in conformity with the inquisitorial tradition, more weight is attached 
 
181. Subject to the caveat that it is at least theoretically possible that prosecutors in Canada 
and France who commit misconduct lose their job or suffer other work-related consequences. 
182. See supra, notes 33-61 and accompanying text. 
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to the pre-trial phase where the evidence should be collected in a non-
partisan manner. At trial, the judge plays an active role in interrogating 
the defendant and any potential witnesses based on the dossier of 
evidence, leaving only a peripheral role to the procureur and, therefore, 
more limited opportunity for prosecutorial misconduct to have a 
serious impact on the outcome. For French prosecutors, the issues arise 
in the area where they have relatively unfettered power—the 
supervision of an investigation. 
If we want to change prosecutorial behavior to a significant 
extent, we need to change the structural factors that produce the 
behavior we do not want. This may include measures suggested by 
American scholars around separating the prosecutorial and adversarial 
function from Canadian and American prosecutors, permitting some 
judicial review of prosecutorial decision-making in Canada and 
America, but also working towards improving the justice of the 
criminal law for which prosecutors are responsible. In France, the most 
productive changes are likely to be ones which reduce or check the 
power of prosecutors in relation to the supervision of investigations–
that is, which discourage the uncritical acceptance by French 
prosecutors of improper investigatory practices. These changes may 
not be realistically likely to be adopted, but the comparative experience 
between America, France and Canada suggests that it is in structural 
reforms that prosecutorial misconduct can be addressed. 
The comparisons offer less clear support for the importance of 
culture to shaping prosecutorial decisions. All Canadian prosecutors 
have guidelines and policy manuals, and in general the professional 
culture of Canadian lawyers is different from the United States, tending 
to be somewhat less focused on the unqualified virtues of 
zealousness.183 Yet Canadian prosecutors still commit professional 
misconduct. The nature and extent of that misconduct may be less 
significant and consequential than that which occurs in the United 
States, but we do not have data to support that conclusion. It may also 
be that the guidelines given to all Canadian prosecutors with respect to 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion support prosecutors in not 
engaging in misconduct when exercising that discretion. We suspect, 
however, that the systemic factors are far more significant in preventing 
that behavior. Although strong inquisitorial expectations shape the role 
 
183. See Alice Woolley, Integrity in Zealousness: Comparing the Standard Conceptions 
of the Canadian and American Lawyer, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 61 (1996). 
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of the French prosecutor in theory, research has shown that procureurs 
often share the police crime control objectives in practice, putting the 
fairness of the French criminal process at risk, given the limited role 
afforded to defense lawyers. It may be that cultural initiatives could 
shift the attitudes of French prosecutors favoring crime control, but it 
is unclear how, absent a structural shift, that change could be 
accomplished. In our view, reforms directed at improving prosecutorial 
culture are unlikely to be particularly effective in changing 
prosecutorial behavior unless coupled with structural reforms. 
With respect to regulatory responses, the current absence of 
meaningful regulation, when combined with the observation that 
structural factors materially affect prosecutorial conduct, suggests that 
improving how we regulate prosecutors may be effective in improving 
prosecutorial behavior. It is hard not to see some regulatory response 
as being better than next to none. Meaningful regulation in the form of 
clear rules, real consequences for violation of the rules, or—more 
importantly—adopting innovative forms of compliance regulation for 
prosecutorial offices may have a meaningful positive impact on 
prosecutorial behavior. On the other hand, the cross-jurisdictional 
unwillingness to regulate prosecutors may also suggest, as Green and 
Zacharias noted,184 that more rigorous regulation is not realistically 
likely to be pursued. Neither courts nor regulators in any jurisdiction 
have shown much enthusiasm for addressing prosecutorial misbehavior 
through regulatory means. 
Finally, with respect to reforms focused on the “do justice” norm, 
while no jurisdiction articulates that norm particularly well, the fact that 
all three jurisdictions rely on it, yet have material deficiencies in 
prosecutorial conduct, makes us skeptical about the capacity for a better 
articulated norm to, on its own, change prosecutorial behavior. As 
acknowledged, the norms as currently stated do not provide especially 
useful direction to prosecutors and, in Canada and the United States at 
least, suffer from internal incoherence and deep ambiguity. The various 
proposals for better articulating what that norm means and requires 
would inarguably improve its capacity for shaping prosecutorial 
behavior (although which approach was adopted would require 
normative choices to be made, since the proposals do not all run in the 
same direction). At the same time, no honest prosecutor could claim 
that the behavior documented in case law and studies of prosecutorial 
 
184. Zacharias & Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 7, at 58-59. 
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behavior is consistent with the “do justice” ethic, however inadequately 
that ethic has been expressed. The things prosecutors sometimes do in 
Canada, the United States and, to a lesser extent, in France involve 
trying to win at all costs, denying procedural rights to the accused and 
tilting the scales of justice in favor of conviction; acting, in other words, 
entirely contrary to what a prosecutor would do if they were seeking 
justice. This suggests, in our view, that more carefully or deeply 
explaining the “do justice” ethic will not, without more, meaningfully 
affect prosecutorial behavior. Structural and regulatory changes are 
what is required. 
Our comparative analysis thus concludes on a somewhat gloomy 
note—the most effective changes are likely to be structural and 
regulatory, but they are also the least likely to be pursued. Changes that 
may be less difficult to achieve, to culture or to how we articulate 
governing norms, are the least likely to have any effect on prosecutorial 
behavior. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
No group of lawyers has higher ambitions, yet so significantly and 
frequently fails to achieve them, than criminal prosecutors. Prosecutors 
in America, Canada, and France seek to do justice but, albeit in 
different ways, do not. Can we do better? American academic literature 
has set out different paths for reform—through shifts to the structure, 
regulation, culture or norms governing American prosecutors. The 
comparative analysis of this paper, which considers the similarities and 
differences between the norms, behavior and work environment of 
American, Canadian, and French prosecutors, provides some insights 
into the merits of those proposed reforms. The question going forward 
will be whether any of these jurisdictions will be willing to embrace 
reform, particularly the sorts of reforms most likely to create better 
behavior by prosecutors. Ensuring prosecutors accomplish justice 
requires something different than telling them to be just: it requires 
making justice likely in light of the substantive norms of the criminal 
law and the structural design of the criminal justice system. A criminal 
justice system that punishes unjustly, or grants prosecutors unchecked 
power, will not reliably accomplish any sort of justice. 
 
